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1The Explicit Economics of Knowledge Codification and Tacitness
by
Robin Cowan, Paul A. David, and Dominique Foray
1. Introduction
With increasing frequency these days references appear in the economics
literature to “ tacit knowledge” . More often than not the meaning of this
term itself is something that remains literally tacit— which is to say,
those who employ it are silent as to its definition. Something is suggested
nevertheless by the common practice of juxtaposing mention of tacit
knowledge and references to “ codified knowledge.”  What is all this about?
Why has this distinction been made, and what significance does it have for
economists?
Michael Polanyi (1958, 1967) introduced the term into modern circulation,
by pointing to the existence of “ the tacit dimension of knowledge,”  a
form or component of human knowledge distinct from, but complementary to
the knowledge explicit in conscious cognitive processes. Polanyi
illustrated this conceptualization by reference to a fact of common
perception: we all are often aware of certain objects without being focused
on them. This does not make them the less important, as they form the
context that renders focused perception possible, understandable, and
fruitful.
Subsequently, the term tacit knowledge has come to be widely applied to
forms of personal knowledge that are not readily transmitted as
“ information”  which itself is thought of as an ideal-type good having
peculiar economic features that differentiate it from other, conventional
economic commodities.1  As a consequence of the growing practise among
economists of referring to tacit knowledge when alluding to what is in
effect a residual category of knowledge, the original psychological and
contextual usage of the term has been largely discarded. Tacit knowledge
thus has come to signify an absolute type, namely: “ not codified”
knowledge. As such, however, the label now covers the implicit complement
of a category of containing a various forms of information and social
                    
1
 Most significant, from the economist’s viewpoint, is the absence of
super-additivity and the negligible marginal costs of transmitting
information.  These properties and their implications are discussed more
fully in the following text, but the canonical references are Nelson (1959)
and Arrow (1962).
2knowledge, but which itself usually is left undefined and undifferentiated.
The result has been that a good bit of semantic and taxonomic confusion has
been created. These confusions, unfortunately, are being exploited to
advance economic policy arguments that claim to be grounded upon well-
established propositions about the existence of different kinds of
knowledge pertinent to scientific, technological and organizational
innovation, whereas, in many instances, such claims are neither
analytically nor empirically warranted. In this paper we review the way the
concepts of tacitness and codification are currently employed, and suggest
a re-conceptualization of this aspect of the economics of knowledge
production and distribution.
To motivate our proposals we begin by examining the ways in which
“ tacitness”  has come to figure in contemporary economic policy decisions.
The paper’s following section elaborates on the respects in which the
terminology of tacitness now in circulation, having drifted away from its
original epistemological and psychological moorings, has become
increasingly amorphous; indeed, that it new obscures more than it
clarifies. Among the things that have thus been hidden are analytical and
empirical flaws in the emerging critique of the old economics of R&D, and
in the new rationale for subsidies based on the intrinsic tacitness of
technological knowledge. We contend that our proposed alternative,
explicitly economic framework for the study of knowledge codification
activities offers a more useful guide for further research directed to
informing public policies for science, technological innovation and long-
run economic growth.
2. The tacit dimension’s wonderful new economics career
Why should economists become involved in discussions of the nature of
knowledge, and begin sorting it into various categories? Isn’t this
something better left for epistemologists and others of similar
philosophical inclination? Although one might be disposed to answer the
latter in the affirmative, it is now too late to insist on ignoring the
very meaning of something  that economists and other social scientists seem
bent upon discussing.
More than merely a topic of idle talk, tacitness has become an increasingly
“ loaded”  buzzword, freighted with both methodological and policy
significance for the economics of science and technology, and economic
growth more generally. Indeed, recognition of a tacit dimension of human
knowledge has been used both to attack and to defend government
subsidization of science and engineering.
It is fair to say that the concept’s recent popularization began with the
3pioneering work of those who called themselves sociologists of scientific
knowledge (SSK), by way of differentiating their approach from that of the
Mertonian school in the sociology of science. The ‘SSK’ approach was more
interested in the way sociological forces shaped the cognitive aspects of
scientific work, rather than its institutional settings, reward structures,
and the like. They observed that some kinds of knowledge deployed in
scientific inquiry — such as the functioning of experimental apparatus and
instruments, and the way to read and interpret the data obtained with the
help thereof— did not seem to be transmitted among the researchers through
any explicit statements. H. Collins’ (1974) influential study of the
construction of the TEA laser concluded: “ The major point is that the
transmission of skills is not done through the medium of written words.”
Subsequent contributors to the sociology of scientific and technological
knowledge have read such observations has showing that “ the diffusion of
knowledge could not be reduced to the mere transmission of information” —
to quote from Michel Callon’s recent and authoritative survey in The
Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (1995).
A contrast was thus posed between the “ algorithmic model”  of knowledge
production, which involves generation and transmission of explicit,
propositional statements, on the one hand, and the so-called
“ enculturation model”  of scientific activity, on the other hand. This
distinction was primarily invoked among philosophers and sociologists to
challenge the notion that science, and the modern scientific method, was a
source of “ privileged”  statements. The privilege in question implied that
scientific statements could be stripped from the social contexts in which
these had been formed and in which they had acquired meaning, and
promulgated as belonging to the “ codified” , authoritative body of
knowledge about the physical world. Challengers of that view leaned heavily
on the importance of tacit knowledge in the actual conduct of scientific
activities.
For a while, however, economists took little if any interest in the
distinction being drawn between the algorithmic and enculturation models,
and its possible sequelae.  But things have moved on from that stage.
Whether they have “ advanced” , however, remains another matter.  Tacit
knowledge is invoked today by those who challenge the “ algorithmic”
approach of modern economic analysis of all aspects of human behavior. The
challenge is raised not only against neo-classical formulations, but to
virtually every construction of rational decision processes as the basis
for modeling and explaining the behaviors of individual agents. If crucial
aspects of human knowledge cannot be explicitly formulated linguistically
and articulated, how can it be made a basis for optimization, or indeed,
consistent calculation of any sort?  One may see the seeds of this
flowering critique of neoclassical economics in the early attention paid to
Polanyi’s (1958, 1967) writings by Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter (1982);
and, subsequently, in the rationale offered for the more thorough-going
4rejection of microeconomic optimization in the evolutionary models of
Schumpeterian competition.2
The challenge brought against algorithmic representations of knowledge
generation and acquisition, however, goes much deeper than arguments for
bounded rationality following Newell and Simon (1972);  and it has been
argued in far more sweeping, general terms by critics of the whole
Artificial Intelligence program,  such as Douglas Hofstader (1979) and,
more recently, Roger Penrose (1989, 1997). In such quarters, tacit
knowledge has come to stand for the aspects of human intelligence that
cannot be mimicked by any (computer) algorithm.
The lead in bringing the significance of “ tacit knowledge”  to the
attention of economists was taken by Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter
(1982), whose discussion of the parallels between individual human skills
and organizational capacities (in An Evolutionary Theory of Economic
Change, Ch. 4) gave prominence to Polanyi’s concept.  Those passages remain
as perceptive and stimulating, and as fresh and balanced today as when they
first appeared 17 years ago, and it is unfortunate that a larger proportion
of those economists who now talk about tacit knowledge and its implications
do not appear to have acquainted themselves with this “ local source.”
Had things been otherwise, it seems only reasonable to suppose that we
would have been spared at least the more serious confusions and unwarranted
generalizations that have become commonplace in the literature.
What Nelson and Winter (1982) say about the nature and significance of
tacitness in knowledge conveys not one sharply defined concept, but a nexus
of meanings, each carrying somewhat distinctive implications. Their first
reference to the term (1982, p. 73), for example, offers only a
parenthetical clarification:
“ The knowledge that underlies skillful performance is in large
measure tacit knowledge, in the sense that the performer is not
fully aware of the details of the performance and finds it difficult
or impossible to articulate a full account of those details.”
(Emphasis added.)
Yet, as was made clear shortly following this statement, Nelson and Winter
accepted Polanyi’s (1967) account of such situations as being contextual,
rather than absolute: “ the aim of a skillful performance”  may “ be
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  See, for example, for example, Dosi (1988), Dosi et al. (1988), Dosi and
Egidi (1991).  Evolutionary modeling in economics now spans a wide range of
practice regarded how “ bounded”  the bounded rationality of agents is
assumed to be. Anderson (1994) discusses this and other issues in the
algorithmic representation of the general class of “ Nelson-Winter type”
models.
5achieved by the observance of a set of rules which are not known as such to
the person following them.”   Reference was made to Polanyi’s earlier
philosophical work, Personal Knowledge (1958, p. 49), where an example is
presented of a swimmer keeping himself buoyant by regulating respiration,
yet remaining unconscious of doing so.  In this case the operant rule
(“ never empty your lungs fully” ) plainly is one that is articulable,
could be known to another person, and so might be transmitted verbally by a
swimming instructor— were the latter aware of the principle of buoyancy.
In other words, Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 77) do not insist, any more
than did Polanyi, that tacitness implied “ inarticulability” ; even though
the inarticulability of some (personal) knowledge logically implied that
the latter would remain “ tacit” .
On the question of “ awareness” , Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 78) recognize
that the skillful performer may have “ subsidiary awareness”  of the rules
that are being followed, while being “ focally aware”  of some other— most
probably novel— facet of the task in which she is engaged. This reinforces
an appreciation of the contextual boundaries within which knowledge will be
“ tacit”  rather than explicitly recognized and articulated. Yet, if one
can describe behavior in terms of “ rule conformity” , then it is clear
that the underlying knowledge is codifiable— and indeed may have previously
been “ codified” , or at least articulated.
Most significant still for what we shall say about the more recent strain
of the literature on tacitness is Nelson and Winter’s (1982, p. 78)
acknowledgement that this quality is not inherent in the knowledge. They
write: “ The same knowledge, apparently, is more tacit for some people than
for others. Incentives, too, clearly matter: when circumstances place a
great premium on effective articulation, remarkable things can sometimes be
accomplished.”  In amplification of this point, they offer the example of
an expert pilot giving successful verbal instruction via radio to a
complete novice as to how to land an airplane— even though the “ expert”
had never had occasion previously to make explicit what was entailed in his
successful performance of a landing. Indeed, the section on “ Skills and
Tacit Knowledge”  concludes by emphasizing that “ costs matter. Whether a
particular bit of knowledge is in principle articulable or necessarily
tacit is not the relevant question in most behavioral situations. Rather,
the question is whether the costs…are sufficiently high so that the
knowledge in fact remains tacit”  (p. 80).
It is unfortunate that these more complicated aspects of the concept have
been all but forgotten— were they ever widely grasped— when “ tacitness”
made its debut on the economic policy stage. Among the most notable of the
uses to which the idea of tacit knowledge is being put on the more mundane
levels at which most economists operate, and certainly the uses that have
the greatest impact in economic policy circles, has been the
qualification— and in some instances the outright rejection— of the
6practical policy conclusions drawn from the classic information-theoretic
analysis of the economics of R&D activities.
Following the seminal work of Kenneth Arrow (1955, 1962) and Richard Nelson
(1959), an entire generation of economists treated scientific and
technological knowledge as “ information.”  To that degree, they reasoned,
the knowledge generated by research activities possessed certain generic
properties of public goods. Much of the case for government subsidization
of science and engineering research, and for innovative activity more
generally came to be grounded on the proposition that qua information, such
knowledge could not be optimally produced or distributed through the
workings of competitive markets.
But, nowadays, we are more and more frequently instructed otherwise. In the
newer understanding of science and technology as being pursuits
inextricably involved with tacit knowledge, it is claimed that the old
public policy rationales are exploded; the essential understandings are
said to be the portion of knowledge that remains uncodified, and so
deprived of the public goods properties that would result in informational
spillovers and market failure. Thus, as this argument concludes, the
traditional economic case for subsidizing science and research in general
collapses, as there is little or no basis for a presumption of market
failure.
But, at the same time, tacit knowledge is invoked by defenders of
government subsidization of science as part of a strategic innovation
policy. A standard argument against public subsidy to science is that
foreigners engaging in applied, commercially oriented R&D would free-ride
(since information is a public good and travels freely) by exploiting the
basic knowledge discoveries that our researchers vie to codify for
disclosure in the scientific journals and similar archival publications. To
this, the proponents of tacit knowledge reply, nations, and regions, like
individual enterprises undertaking R&D investments, can count of the
benefits of “ sticky data” — to use Eric von Hippel’s (1993) arresting
term.  Knowledge does not travel freely, a condition that rests largely on
the importance of tacit knowledge residing only in the heads of the
scientists and engineers engaged in its production. Codified knowledge may
have low marginal costs of transmission and is thus slippery and hard to
contain, but that is largely irrelevant if what one needs is its
“ sticky” , tacit counterpart. 3
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  In subsequent work von Hippel (1994) generalizes the idea so that it
covers all situations in which there is an appreciable cost of transferring
information,  especially that relevant for innovative activities.  In
principle, at least, von Hippel’s use of the notion of “ stickiness”  makes
no distinction between transfer costs consisting of pure rents imposed by
7The inherent “ stickiness”  of certain kinds of knowledge, consequently,
enables business (or other) entities to protect their ability fully to
appropriate the benefits derivable from their research investments by
controlling access to the repositories of uncodified knowledge. For this,
minimal recourse is required to the protection of intellectual property in
the form of patents and copyrights; a mixture of trade secrecy law and
labor law (master-servant relations) governing the behavior of current and
former employees, may be enough. Thus, curious though it may seem, the
tacit dimension of scientific and technological knowledge has found a new
career for itself in science and technology policy debates: it is beginning
to supplant its now dubious companion, “ codified knowledge” , as the core
of a new rationale for government research funding intended to build
national and regional “ competitiveness”  through innovation.
According to this application of the argument, even though the essential
tacit knowledge concerning how to exploit what has been invented might be
less than perfectly “ sticky” , what this implies is that its economic
benefits are only available to be captured locally. In other, more formal,
terms, it is asserted that the marginal costs of knowledge transmission
rise very rapidly with “ distance”  from the context in which such
knowledge was generated. Research by-products in the form of technological
knowledge— being concerned with how best to get instrumentation involving
chemical, mechanical, electrical and optical processes to work— are seen as
inherently more strongly tacit in nature. That is held to be particularly
beneficial for would-be commercial developers who are able to situate
closer to the locus of such discoveries (see e.g. Pavitt (1987), Patel and
Pavitt (1995), Nelson (1992)).
A broad policy implication, following from this, is that for an economy to
have a strong, innovative manufacturing sector, it is necessary also to
have correspondingly strong applied and basic research activities situated
in close proximity to the production operations themselves.  The following
passage extracted from an article by John Kay (1999, p. 13) in Science and
Public Affairs, is illustrative of the more elaborate statements of the new
innovation strategy perspective that has now formed around the concept of
tacitness in the business management literature:
“ Since ‘knowledge that’— the characteristic discoveries of
natural science— is easily transmitted, one solution [to the problem
of creating ‘knowledge-based competitive advantages’] is to
continually innovate and stay one step ahead. And that kind of
innovative capacity depends on knowledge that isn’t ‘knowledge
                                                               
the owners of intellectual property rights, on the one hand, and real
social resource costs such as those entailed in physically transporting an
expert for the purpose of demonstrating the  proper use of a novel product
or process in a distant location.
8that’, but ‘knowledge how’— i.e. tacit knowledge.
“ Tacit knowledge can take many forms, but it cannot be written
down. It is unique to an organization— and therefore cannot be
copied…The benefits of such tacit knowledge arise only through a
culture of trust and knowledge-sharing within an organization…
“ Tacit knowledge isn’t a phenomenon exclusively existing within a
single organization…It also exists between companies, consumers,
suppliers and scientific laboratories…”
Thus, a notion that took its origins in the psychology of individual human
motor skills has been wonderfully transmuted, first, from an
epistemological category into a phenomenon of inarticulable inter-
organizational relationships, and thence to one of the keys to corporate,
and perhaps also national competitive advantage!
One corollary of this class of arguments is that the case for granting
public subsidies and tax concessions to private companies that invest in
R&D would correspondingly be weakened, were it not for the difficulties
caused these firms by the circulation of their research personnel.4
Scientific and engineering staff are able to carry critical tacit knowledge
off to potential rival firms that offer them better terms of employment,
including equity ownership in “ start ups”  of their own. In the logic of
this approach, recognition of the criticality of tacit knowledge argues for
further strengthening of trade secrecy protections, to block those
“ leakages”  and altogether eliminate the market failure rationale for
governmental support of the performance of R&D by the private sector.5 That
leaves the way open for those who wish to mount an essentially “ techno-
mercantilist”  argument for R&D subsidies, grounded on the idea that the
country can benefit from job-creation, etc., if its firms win the race to
be first to launch new products in international markets. It is, in effect,
a new strategic trade policy argument, grounded on the claim that tacit
knowledge permits national appropriation of the direct and indirect
benefits of monopolizing international product riches by being “ first to
                    
4
 We can observe that the more things change the more they stay the same.
We have moved from the view that the problem to be solved arises from the
fact that a firm’s knowledge is easily appropriated by other firms.
Acknowledging the importance of tacit knowledge, and thus that the initial
problem may not be so severe, we face a “ new problem”  stemming from the
fact that a firm’s knowledge workers are easily appropriated by other
firms. In both cases the general issue remains however —  fluidity of
knowledge or information (whether transmitted through codified knowledge or
labor mobility) is good for the economy but bad for the individual firm.
5
 See, e.g., Kealey (1996) on industrial secrecy as the suitable “ remedy”
for the problem of informational spillovers from research, and the critique
of that position in David (1997).
9invest” .
The foregoing brief account of the wonderful career that has thrust “ the
tacit dimension”  into the science and technology policy limelight serves
to identify a number of issues that seem of sufficient importance to
warrant further consideration. We see a need to put the economics of tacit
and codified knowledge on analytically firmer and terminologically more
precise foundations than those upon which most of the recent literature
presently rests. The notion that the economic case for public support of
science and engineering should now be based upon the inherently tacit and
“ craft”  nature of research activities certainly is rather paradoxical.
Taken at face value, it suggests that intellectual property protection is
unjustified, since, in the “ natural”  state of things, there are no
“ externalities”  of new knowledge. By implication, the patent system’s
exchange of monopoly of use for “ disclosure”  allows the patentee to
retain the tacit knowledge without which the information contained in the
patent really is useless.
But, before rushing to discard everything we know about the economics of
R&D, however, scientific scepticism instructs us to ask whether the
epistemological foundations of the argument are really all that solid. We
should therefore question whether the economic functioning and attributes
of tacit and codified knowledge are well understood by those who would
invoke it in the context of current policy debates.
This essay responds to these felt needs by presenting what might be
described as “ the sceptical economist’s guide to ‘tacit knowledge’” . We
agree that the questions economists and others have been discussing under
the general rubric of tacit knowledge are truly important. Furthermore, we
acknowledge that some of the now-classic contributions to the economics of
R&D, when regarded from an epistemological perspective, appear
unwarrantedly simplistic in their handling of some subtle questions
concerning “ knowledge”  and “ information” , and the relationship between
the two. An explicit re-examination of some fundamental conceptual
underpinnings in this area requires that we re-open some questions that
readers coming to the topic from economics may feel are settled well enough
for their purposes.  We believe that the next section (3) makes a
persuasvie case to the contrary, and so establishes that there is a need
for a new taxonomic framework in this area.  That framework is set out (in
sections 4 and 5), and we proceed to apply it in analyzing the economic
determinants of codification (in sections 6 and 7).
3. Codification and tacitness
It will be easiest for us to start not with concept of tacit knowledge, but
at the opposite. and seemingly less problematic end of the field, so to
10
speak, by asking what is to be understood by the term “ codified
knowledge.”  Its obvious reference is to codes, or to standards— whether of
notation or of rules, either of which may be promulgated by authority or
may acquire “ authority”  through frequency of usage and common consent, by
de facto acceptance.
Knowledge that is recorded in some codebook serves inter alia as a storage
depository, as reference point, and possibly as an authority. But
information written in a code can only perform those functions when people
are able to interpret the code; and, in the case of the latter two
functions, to give it more or less mutually consistent interpretations.
Successfully reading the code in this last sense may involve prior
acquisition of considerable specialized knowledge (quite possibly including
knowledge not written down anywhere). There is as a rule no reason to pre-
suppose that all people in the world possess the knowledge needed to
interpret the codes properly. This means that what is codified for one
person or group may be tacit for another, and an utterly impenetrable
mystery for a third. Thus context— temporal, spatial, cultural and social—
becomes an important consideration in any discussion of codified knowledge.
In what follows, we make use extensively of the notion of a codebook. We
use “ codebook”  to refer both to what might be considered a dictionary
that agents use to understand written documents, but apply it also to cover
the documents themselves. This implies several things regarding
codification and codebooks. First, codifying a piece of knowledge adds
content to the codebook. Second, codifying a piece of knowledge draws upon
the pre-existing contents of the codebook. This creates a self-referential
situation, which can be particularly severe when the knowledge activity
takes place in a new sphere or discipline. Initially, there is no codebook,
either in the sense of a book of documents, or in the sense of a
dictionary. Thus initial codification activity involves creating the
specialized dictionary. Models must be developed, as must the vocabulary
with which to express those models. When models and a language have been
developed, documents can be written. Clearly, early in the life of a
discipline or technology, standardization of the language (and of the
models) will be an important part of the collective activity of
codification. When this “ dictionary”  aspect of the codebook becomes large
enough to stabilize the “ language” , the “ document”  aspect can grow
rapidly.6 But new documents will inevitably introduce new concepts,
notation and terminology, so that “ stabilization”  must not be interpreted
to imply a complete cessation of dictionary-building.
The meaning of “ codification”  intersects with the recent literature on
economic growth. Much of modern endogenous growth theory rests on the
                    
6
 See Cowan and Foray (1997) for a further discussion of this issue.
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notion that there exists a “ world stock of knowledge,”  and, perhaps, also
a “ national knowledge-base”  that has stock-like characteristics. This is
true particularly of those models in which R&D is seen as both drawing
upon, and adding to, “ a knowledge stock”  which enters as an input into
production processes for other goods. How ought we to characterize this, or
indeed any related conceptualization of a  world stock of knowledge?
Implicit in this literature is that this stock is codified, since part or
all of it is assumed to be freely accessible by all economic agents in the
system under analysis. Unpacking this idea only partially suffices to
reveal some serious logical difficulties with any attempt to objectify “ a
social stock of knowledge,”  let alone with the way that the new growth
theory has sought to employ the concept of an aggregate knowledge stock.7
The “ new growth theory”  literature falls squarely within the tradition
emphasizing the public-goods nature of knowledge. So, one may surmise that
the world stock of knowledge surely has to be the union of private stocks
of codified knowledge: anything codified for someone is thereby part of the
world knowledge stock. Such reasoning, however, may involve a fallacy of
composition or of aggregation. One might reasonably have thought that the
phrase “ world knowledge stock”  refers to the stock available to the
entire world. But if the contextual aspect of knowledge and codification
(on which see supra) is to be taken seriously, the world stock of codified
knowledge might better be defined as the intersection of individuals’ sets
of codified knowledge— that being the portion that is “ shared”  in the
sense of being both known and commonly accessible.8 It then follows that
the world stock of knowledge, being the intersection of private stocks,
whether codified or tacit, is going to be very small.
The foregoing suggests that there is a problem in principle with those
models in the “ new growth theory”  which have been constructed around (the
formalized representation of) a universal stock of technological knowledge
to which all agents might contribute and from which all agents can draw
costlessly.   That, however, is hardly the end of the difficulties arising
                    
7
  See Machlup (1980: pp.167-169) for discussion of  “ the phenomenological
theory of knowledge”   developed by Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann
(1973: Chs. 3-4).  The latter arrive at a concept described by Machlup as
“ the fully objectivated knowledge of society, a social stock of knowledge
which  in some sense is the result of a socialization of knowledge [through
individual interactions involving private stocks of subjective but inter-
subjectively valid knowledge] and contains at the same time more and less
than the sum of the private stocks of subjective knowledge….This most
ingenious phenomenological throy of the stock of knowledge in society is
not equipped to dealth with …the problem of assessing the size of the stock
and its growth.”
8
 It is clear that the availability of two operators— union and
intersection— when combined with two types of knowledge— tacit and
codified— leads to a situation in which “ the worldstock of knowledge”  is
going to take some defining.
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from the primacy accorded to the accumulation of “ a knowledge stock”  in
the recent literature on endogenous economic growth. The peculiarities of
knowledge as an economic commodity, namely, the heterogeneous nature of
ideas and their infinite expansibility, have been cast in the paradigm
“ new economic growth”  models as the fundamental non-convexity,
responsible for increasing returns to investment in this intangible form of
capital. Heterogeneity implies the need for a metric in which the
constituent parts can be rendered commensurable, but given the especially
problematic nature of competitive market valuations of knowledge, the
economic aggregation problem is particularly vexatious in this case.
Futhermore, the extent to which the infinite expansibility of knowledge
actually is exploited, therefore, becomes a critical matter in defining the
relevant stock -- even though in these formulations of the new growth
theory this matter generally has been glossed over.  Critics of these
models’ relevance have quite properly pointed out that much technologically
relevant knowledge is not codified, and therefore has substantial marginal
costs of reproduction and re-application; they maintain that inasmuch as
this so-called “ tacit knowledge”  possesses the properties of normal
commodities, its role in the process of growth approaches that of
conventional tangible capital.9  If it is strictly complementary with the
codified part of the knowledge stock, then the structure of the models
implies that either R&D activity or some concomitant process must cause the
two parts of the aggregate stock to grow pari-passus.  Alternatively, the
growth of the effective size of the codified knowledge stock would be
constrained by whatever governs the expansion of its tacit component.
Pursuing these points further is not within the scope of this paper,
however; we wish merely to stress once again, and from a different
perspective, that the nature of knowledge, its codification or tacitness,
lurks only just beneath the surface of important ideas about economic
growth.
Leaving to one side, then, the problematic issue of defining and
quantifying the world stocks of either codified knowledge or tacit
                    
9
  This view could be challenged on the grounds that knowledge held
secretly by individuals is not distingushable from labor (tangible human
capital) as a productivity input, but, unlike tanglible physical capital,
the existence of undisclosed knowledge assets cannot be ascertained.
Machlup (1980, p. 175), in the sole passage devoted to the significance of
tacit knowledge, adopts the latter position and  argues that :
“ Generation of socially new knowledge is another non-operational concept
as long as generation is not complemented by dissemination….Only if {an
individual] shares his knowledge with others can one recognize that new
knowledge has been created. Generation of knowledge without dissemination
is socially worthless as well as unascertainable.  Although ‘tacit
knowledge’ cannot be counted in any sort of inventory, its creation my
still be a part of the production of knowledge if the activities that
generate it have a measureable cost.”
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knowledge, we can now turn to a fundamental empirical question regarding
tacit knowledge.  Below, we address explicitly whether some situations,
described as rife with tacit knowledge, really are so, but for the moment
we can make an important point without entering into that issue.
Some activities seem to involve knowledge that is unvoiced— activities
which clearly involve knowledge but which refer only seldom to texts, or
put another way, which clearly involve considerable knowledge beyond the
texts that are referred to in the normal course of the activity.10 Thus we
can ask why is some knowledge silent, or unvoiced? There are two possible
explanations: the knowledge is unarticulable, or, being capable of
articulation, it remains unvoiced for some reason.
Why would some knowledge remain unarticulable? The standard economist’s
answer is simply that this is equivalent to asking why there are
“ shortages” , to which one must reply “ there are no shortages”  when there
are markets. So, the economist says, knowledge is not articulated because,
relative to the state of demand, the cost, and supply price, is too high.
Articulation, being social communication, pre-supposes some degree of
codification, but if it costs too much actually to codify, this piece of
knowledge may remain partly or wholly uncodified. Without making any
disparaging remarks about this view, we can simply point out that there is
some knowledge for which we do not even know how to begin the process of
codification, which means that the price calculation could hardly be
undertaken in the first place. Recognition of this state of affairs
generates consensus on the uncodifiable nature of the knowledge in
question. We raise this point to emphasize that the category of
unarticulable (which may be co-extensive with uncodifiable) may be safely
put to one side in what follows. That, of course, supposes there is still a
lot left to discuss.
It is worth emphasizing the existence of the two distinctions, and the
degree to which they define co-extensive sets of knowledge. Knowledge that
is unarticulable is also uncodifiable, and vice versa— if it is (not)
possible to articulate a thought so that it may be expressed in terms that
another can understand, then it is (not) possible to codify it. This is the
source of the statement above that articulation pre-supposes codifiability.
It is not the case, though, that codifiability necessitates codification; a
paper may be thought out fully, yet need not actually be written out.
Operationally, the codifiability of knowledge (like the articulable nature
of a thought) cannot be ascertained independently from the actions of
codification and articulation. But, when we consider the question of the
status of knowledge with reference to multiple contexts, the preceding
                    
10
 We note that activities involving “ unvoiced knowledge’ are often
assumed to involve thereby tacit knowledge. We argue below that this is too
hasty.
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strictly logical relations (implied by a single, universal context) are not
exhaustive categories. Thus we see the possible emergence of a category:
codified (ever) but not articulated (now, here).11 This observation implies
that care needs to be taken in jumping from the observed absence of
codified knowledge in a specified context to the conclusion that only some
non-codifiable (i.e. tacit) knowledge is available or employed.
It is within the realm of the codifiable or articulable-yet-uncodified,
that price considerations come into play in an interesting way. Within this
category reside decisions about the activity of codification, its costs and
benefits. We shall discuss the factors entering into the determination of
that knowledge-status more fully below.
4. A proposed knowledge topography
With these preliminaries behind us, we now proceed to examine a knowledge
topography from which it will soon be self-evident that the realm of the
tacit has been considerably reduced.
The topography we are about to propose is meant to be consulted in thinking
about where various knowledge transactions or activities take place, rather
than where knowledge of different sorts may be said to reside. We should
emphasize that as economists, and not epistemologists, we are substantively
more interested in the former than in the latter.
By knowledge activities we refer to two kinds of activities: the generation
and use of “ intellectual (abstract) knowledge” ; and the generation and
use of “ practical knowledge” , that is mainly knowledge about technologies
and artifacts (how to use this tool, this car, or how to improve their
performances) and about organizations.
Given that definition, we need to clarify the distinction between knowledge
embodied in an artifact and codified knowledge about an artifact. The
distinction between embodied and disembodied knowledge is a nice way for
economists to capture features of intersectoral flows (of technologies),
particularly in an input-output framework. Therefore, the fact that
knowledge is embodied in a machine tool is not to be conflated with the
codification problem. However, knowledge about the production and the use
of artifacts, of course, falls in our set of issues about codification:
does the use of this new tool requires the permanent reference to a set of
                    
11
  In understanding these distinctions it is important to remember that we
are discussing knowledge activities, and the kinds of knowledge used in
them. Thus we can observe activities in which the knowledge has been
codified at some point in history, but is not articulated in current
endeavors.
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codified instructions or not?  We can make this point in a slightly
different way. From the point of view of a producer, any artifact, from a
hammer to a computer, embodies considerable knowledge. The artifact is
often an exemplar of that knowledge, and can sometimes be thought of as a
store of it, and the means through which the knowledge is marketed. From
the point of view of the user, however, this is not the case. While any
user will admit that the producer needed a variety of kinds of knowledge to
produce the artifact, this is of little practical interest. The knowledge
of interest, whether codified or not, and indeed that is often the issue,
is how to use the artifact, rather than the knowledge embedded in it.
Part of the reason for this interpretation of what is located in our
topography is simply that discussion about “ where knowledge resides”  is
difficult without falling into, or attempting to avoid, statements about
the relative sizes of the stocks of tacit and codified knowledge, and their
growth rates. By and large entering into pseudo-quantitative discussions of
that sort turns out not to be a useful line; indeed, possibly worse than
unhelpful, it can be misleading. Although there is no scarcity of casual
assertions made regarding the tendency toward increasing (relative)
codification, the issue of the relative sizes of the constituent elements
of the world stocks of scientific and technological knowledge, resists
formal quantitative treatment. That is to say, we really cannot hope to
derive either theoretical propositions or empirical measures in answer to
queries about whether or not the relative size of the codified portion must
be secularly increasing, or, alternatively, whether there is a tendency to
a steady state. The fundamental obstacle to approaching such questions
meaningfully is the vagueness regarding the units in which “ knowledge”  is
to be measured.
To begin, we shall consider a topological tree structure in which
distinctions are drawn at four levels. (The following text refers to Figure
1.)
The tripartite branching on the uppermost level breaks the knowledge
transaction terrain into the zones labeled articulated (and therefore
codified), unarticulated and unarticulable. Setting the third category
aside as not very interesting, we are left with the dichotomy:
(a) Articulated (and thus codified). Here knowledge is recorded and
referred to by 'the group’, which is to say, 'in socio-temporal context’.
Hence we can surmise that a codebook exists, and is referred to in the
usual or standard course of knowledge-making and -using activities.
(b) Unarticulated. Here, we refer to knowledge that is not explicitly
referred to in the typical course of knowledge activities. Again, the
concept of a context or group is important.
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In case (a) a codebook clearly exists, since this is implicit in knowledge
being or having been codified. In case (b) two possible sub-cases can be
considered. In one, knowledge is tacit in the normal sense— it has not been
recorded either in word or artifact, so no codebook exists. In the other,
knowledge may have been recorded, so a codebook exists, but this book may
not be referred to by members of the group— or, if it is, references are so
rare as to be indiscernible to an outside observer. Thus at the next level,
“ unarticulated”  splits into two branches: (b.1) In the situation
indicated to the left, a source or reference manual does exist but it is
out of sight, so we say the situation is that of a displaced codebook;
(b.2) to the right lie those circumstances in which there truly is no
codebook, but in which it would be technically possible to produce one.
Knowledge
Codified,
Articulated
Unart iculate d
C odebook 
Displaced
N o Cod ebook
No  Disagreements Procedural 
Author ity
No Procedural 
Author ity
Formalized Info rmal
Figur e 1:  A t re e st ruc ture  for c odif i ed and unco dif i ed knowl edge
When a codebook exists, we still may refer to the situation in which
knowledge is unarticulated because within the group context the codebook is
not manifest; it is not explicitly consulted, nor in evidence, and an
outside observer therefore would have no direct indication of its
existence. (To the outside observer, this group appears to be using a large
amount of tacit knowledge in its normal operations.) The contents of the
codebook in such situations have been so thoroughly internalized, or
absorbed by the members of the group, that it functions as an implicit
source of authority. Here we can observe in passing that the ability to
displace the codebook (e.g. pass closed-book exams) is often one criterion
for entry, or part of the initiation, into the group.
A “ displaced codebook,”  implies that a codified body of common knowledge
is present, but not manifestly so. Technical terms figure in descriptive
discussion but go undefined because their meaning is evident to all
concerned; fundamental relationships among variables also are not
reiterated in conversations and messages exchanged among members of the
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group, or epistemic community. (This often infuriates outsiders who
complain vociferously about excessive jargon in the writings and speeches
of physicists, economists, and psychologists...) In short, we have just
described a typical state of affairs in what Thomas Kuhn (1962) referred to
as “ normal science” ; it is one where the knowledge base from which the
researchers are working is highly codified, but, paradoxically, its
existence and contents are matters left tacit among the group unless some
dispute or memory problem arises. We can also describe “ normal
technology”  as the state in which knowledge about artifacts is highly
codified but the codebook is not manifest.
Identifying such a zone in which knowledge is codified but the existence of
codification is not manifest is an extremely important result. It raises,
however, a very difficult empirical problem (or perhaps a problem of
observation). This argument is crucial in understanding the economic
problem raised by the management of knowledge in various situations: when
the codebook is displaced and knowledge is highly codified, new needs for
knowledge transfer or storage (or knowledge transactions generally) can be
fulfilled at a rather low cost (it is the cost of making the existing
codebook manifest), while when there is no codebook at all the costs will
be very high (it is the cost of producing a codebook, which includes costs
of developing the languages and the necessary models).
Such a result should lead us to re-examine many empirical studies, which
have been done in the near past and whose main conclusions are that tacit
knowledge remains key in many activities. This is perhaps true but
difficult to document convincingly; all these studies fail to prove that
what is observed is “ true tacitness”  rather than highly codified
knowledge without explicit reference to the codebook. Identifying the
possibility that highly codified knowledge exists but is not manifest makes
us aware of the serious empirical difficulties raised by this issue.
Differentiating among the various cases certainly requires deep and careful
case studies. By definition a codebook which is not manifest is not
observable in that context, and there is a high risk that various
situations can be confused.
When there is no codebook (case b), we again have a two-way division,
turning on the existence, or not, of disputes. There may be no
disagreements. Here there is stabilized uncodified knowledge, collective
memory, convention and so on. This is a very common situation with regard
to procedures and structures within organizations. The IMF has not written
that there in only one prescription for all the monetary and financial ills
of the world’s developing and transition economies, but its advisers
dispensing “ identikit”  loan conditions evidently behave as if such a
“ code”  had been promulgated. Such uncodified-but-stable bodies of
knowledge and practice, in which the particular epistemic community’s
members silently concur, will often find use as a test for admission to the
18
group or a signal of group membership to outside agents.
Where there are disagreements and no codebook is available to resolve them
within the group, it is possible that there exist some rules or principles
for dispute resolution. But, elsewhere, such “ procedural authority”  may
be missing. This is the case of individual gurus, such as business
management gurus like Tom Peters, and others who supply a form of
“ personal knowledge about organizational performance.”  Equivalently, in
terms of the outward characteristics of the situation, this might describe
“ new age”  religions— in contradistinction to structured ecclesiastical
organizations that refer to sacred texts.
On the other hand, it may be the case that when disagreements arise there
is some procedural authority to arbitrate among the parties. Here it is
important to recall that by construction the situation is one in which the
relevant knowledge is not codified, and different members of the
organization/group have different tacit knowledge. When the tacit knowledge
leads to conflict about how to advance the group’s enterprise or endeavor,
there is some way of deciding how to proceed— whether or not this has been
explicitly described and recorded. Clearly, when the procedure is
formalized (codified) we have a recurrence of a distinction paralleling the
one drawn at the top of the tree, between codified and tacit. But this new
bifurcation occurs at the meta-level of procedures for generating and
distributing knowledge, rather than over the contents of knowledge itself.
We can define a different type of group using this meta-level codified-
tacit boundary, so the whole taxonomic apparatus may be unpacked again in
discussing varieties of procedural knowledge.
5. Boundaries in the re-mapped knowledge space, and their significance
Across the space described by the foregoing taxonomic structure it is
possible to define (at least) three interesting boundaries. The “ Collins-
Latour-Callon”  boundary would separate articulated codified knowledge from
all the rest— assigning observational situations in which there was a
displaced codebook to the same realm as that in which learning and
transmission of scientific knowledge, and praxis, was proceeding in the
absence of codification. The line labeled “ the Merton-Kuhn frontier”  puts
codified and codebook-displaced situations together on its left side, and
would focus primary attention there— as it constituted the distinctive
regions occupied by modern science; that would leave all the rest to
general psychological and sociological inquiries about “ enculturation
processes”  involved in human knowledge acquisition.
But, our branching structure recognizes that in the zone to the right of
the Merton-Kuhn frontier there are things that allow epistemic communities
to function. Such communities, which may be small working groups, comprise
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agents who work on a mutually recognized sub-set of knowledge issues, and
who at the very least accept some commonly understood procedural authority
as essential to the success of their collective knowledge-building
activities. They are separated from the region that lies to their right in
the topography, by the line labeled the “ functional epistemic community
boundary.”  Beyond that border lies the zone populated by personal (and
organizational) gurus of one shape or another, including the “ new age”
cult leaders in whom procedural and personal authority over the conduct of
group affairs has been fused.
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As is clear from the foregoing discussion, there are two quite distinct
aspects of knowledge that are pertinent in the codified/tacit discussions,
although they are often left unidentified. On the one hand, knowledge might
or might not be presented or stored in a text. This is the notion
associated with codification. On the other hand, there is the degree to
which knowledge appears explicitly in standard activities. Here, we can
think of knowledge as being manifest or not. Figure 2 elaborates these two
properties in a tableau. For this purpose we have used a 3x3 matrix, in
which one axis represents the extent of codification: Codified, Partially
codified, and Uncodified; the other axis represents the extent to which the
knowledge is manifest, or commonly referred to in knowledge endeavors:
Manifest, Alluded to, and Latent.
These divisions along the axes are patently arbitrary, for mixtures in the
ordinary human knowledge activities form a continuum, rather than a set of
boxes.
To make Figure 2 clearer, it may be useful to look specifically at the four
extreme cases: the corners north-west, south-west, north-east and south-
east. Both the codified-manifest case (the north-west corner) and the
uncodified-latent case (the south-east corner) describe situations which
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are easily comprehensible because the pair of criteria fit naturally
together. The codified-latent case (the north-east) was described as a
situation in which the codebook is displaced while knowledge is not tacit.
Finally the uncodified-manifest case (south-west) describes situations in
which agents start to make their discoveries, inventions, new ideas
manifest (in order to diffuse them) but still cannot use a full and
stabilized codebook to do so. And even “ writing”  a book with which to
make this new knowledge manifest does not necessarily imply codification.
The vocabulary or symbolic expression is still idiosyncratic, there are
many ambiguities, and so on. This implies that while certain aspects of
codification may be present (knowledge storage and recall for example),
other important aspects, in particular communication, are not.
Nevertheless, the overly sharp co-ordinates give us a tableau that may be
used heuristically to distinguish among major regions of the states-space
within which knowledge-groups may be working at a given moment in their
history. Instruction or deliberate knowledge transfer is thus roughly
situated in the tableau’s “ manifest”  column, spilling over somewhat into
the “ Alluded-to”  column. Formal instruction comes near the top
(codified), whereas apprenticeship lies near the bottom (uncodified) of the
array. The world of scientific inquiry extends across the “ ham-shaped”
region that is oriented along the southwest-northeast axis (minor diagonal)
of the array, leaving out the north-west corner. That corner is where
codified knowledge is most plainly manifested, for purposes of didactic
instruction, making use of textbooks, grammars and dictionaries, manuals,
reference standards, and the like. Some apprenticeship training, as we have
remarked, falls into the “ codified and manifest space,”  although even
formal computer-based tutorial programs occupy the liminal zone where
codified knowledge is “ alluded-to”  rather than made explicit.
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The boundaries of the world of engineering and applied R&D also extend
upwards from the south-west corner (in which closed, proprietary research
groups function on the basis of the uncodified skills (experience-based
expertise) of the team members, and their shared and manifest references to
procedures that previously were found to be successful).  But, if we are to
accept the descriptions provided for us by articulate academic engineers,
those boundaries are more tightly drawn than the ones within which science-
groups operate, and in particular do not reach as far upwards into the area
where there is a large body of latent but nevertheless highly codified
knowledge undergirding research and discovery.
6. On the value of this re-mapping
The topography of knowledge that we have presented serves to increase the
precision and to allow greater nuance in the distinctions made among types
of knowledge-getting and transferring pursuits. In addition, it permits
amore fruitful examination of the influence of external, economic
conditions upon the codification and manifestation of knowledge as
information. A number of specific benefits that we see in this way of
looking at the world bear further examination, to which we may now turn.
6.1 On the topography itself
(1a) Figures 1 and 2 clean up a confusion concerning the putative tacitness
of the working knowledge of scientists in situations that we have here been
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able to characterize by applying the ‘displaced codebook’ rubric.
Previously, the literature seems to have fallen to reliance upon an overly
casual observational test, treating situations where no codebook appeared
in evidence as instances in which all that mattered was tacit knowledge,
pure and simple. It is now seen that this fails to allow for the
possibility that explicit references to codified sources of “ authority”
may be supplanted by the formation of “ common knowledge”  regarding the
subscription of the epistemic community to that “ authoritative”  body of
information.
(1b) One may see from Table 1 where the Collins-Latour-Callon boundary lies
and the latter’s positioning in respect to the regeneration of tacit
knowledge; this makes it clear that such a process of regenerating tacit
knowledge— in the course of frequent applications of formal algorithms and
other codified material— clearly rests upon the pre-existing establishment
of a well-articulated body of codified, disciplinary tools.
(1c) Economists’ recent concerns with the economics of knowledge tend to
lie in the ‘no disagreements’ (uncodified, manifest) box in Figure 2. We
are talking here about the literature on ‘sticky data’ or ‘local jargons’
as methods of appropriation. This is the location that creates the ‘quasi’
aspect of knowledge as a quasi-public good, and thus exploration of the
extent to which a type of knowledge is indeed only a quasi-public good will
demand exploration of both the degree of codification and the degree of
manifestation.
(1d) The concept of production of knowledge in Mode 2, advanced by Gibbons
et al. (1996) as an emergent trend of the late twentieth century, has
previously been discussed in terms that draw a contrast with the antecedent
dominant organizational features of scientific inquiry associated with Mode
1, namely that the new form was more dependent upon tacit rather than
codified knowledge, and typically was trans-disciplinary rather than
disciplinary in the lines along which the recruitment of membership, as
well as professional evaluations and rewards were structured. The
conceptualization of Mode 2 as a self-sufficient successor that is now
displacing an earlier, highly institutionalized system of research and
innovation system has been disputed on historical and analytical grounds
(see the discussion and further references in David, Foray and Steinmueller
(1998), for example). But the additional point to notice in the present
context is that such coherence and functionality as groups working in Mode
2 have been able to obtain would appear to rest upon their development of
procedural authority to which the fluid membership subscribes.
6.2 On interactions with external phenomena
(2a) How do changes in information and communications technologies (ICT)
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impinge upon the distribution of knowledge production and distribution
activities within the re-mapped space described by our topography? The
first and most obvious thing to notice is the endogeneity of the boundaries
(which we discuss more fully in the next section). In the new taxonomy
there are two interesting distinctions— knowledge activities may use and
produce codified or uncodified knowledge; or they may use and produce
knowledge that is either manifest or latent. We should re-state here that
‘boundary’ here is not being used in reference to the distribution of the
world knowledge stock, but, instead to the prevailing locus of the
activities of knowledge agents in a specific cognitive, temporal and social
milieu. Nevertheless, it is most likely to be true that the location of a
group’s knowledge stock will be intimately related to, and possibly even
coterminous with the location of its knowledge production activities.
(2b) Organizational goals affect the Manifest/latent boundary. Activities
that couple teaching with research, for example, will be pushed towards the
more fully “ manifest”  region of the statespace. This consideration will
be important in studies of the economics of science, and one particular
example will be in studies of the economics of university funding, and how
different funding structures affect the types of activity within the
university system. (See Geuna, 1998.)
(2c) The positioning of the endogenously determined boundary separating the
codified from the uncodified states of knowledge will be governed by the
following three setoff forces, which we shall examine at greater length,
below. For the present it is sufficient simply to note that these include:
(i) costs and benefits of the activity of codification; (ii) the costs and
benefits of the use of the codified knowledge (data compression,
transmission, storage, retrieval, management...); (iii) feedbacks that
arise because of the way codified knowledge is used to generate further
codified knowledge.
(2d) The age of the discipline (stage in the life cycle) affects both
boundaries. The evolution of a discipline, a technological domain (or of a
research group or a community of practitioners) must now be described as a
movement in the two-dimensional plane of the tableau in Figure 2. Early in
the life-cycle of a knowledge generation endeavor, we begin in the south-
east corner of figure 2, as a disparate group of individuals with no common
authority, highly tacit knowledge, and a very restricted scope for its
transmission beyond the confines of the work-group. Subsequently the locus
of the knowledge-activities moves westward, as agents make their
discoveries and inventions manifest either in physical artifacts or in
published papers, etc. Though scholarly texts may be produced, because the
language in which these reports are couched has not yet been standardized,
codification must still be considered very incomplete.  Nonetheless, this
is where the codification process begins. Thence the movement follows a
northerly course, spreading towards the north-east as disputes arise from
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inconsistencies in description and interpretation, and conflicts emerge
over the way the language will be standardized. As they are resolved, the
system takes an eastward course, landing up in a situation where most of
the actual research activity is carried on within the “ latent-codified”
and “ manifest-partially codified”  domains.
7. The economic determinants of codification
Up until this point attention has been focused on the conceptual
distinctions separating types of knowledge activities, and to describing
the locations of knowledge activities in the space thus delineated. In any
topographic discussion there is a temptation to treat boundaries between
regions as having been imposed from outside the system being examined. In a
sense this is proper, in that structures are often in principle distinct
from the activities that make them. But inasmuch as we are dealing here
with knowledge, and the latter is seen today to be so central to the
process of economic growth, a treatment of the subject would not be useful
were it to omit the question of the boundaries’ genesis, and the forces
that determine their positions. This becomes all the more relevant because
our concern here is not primarily taxonomic; we are less interested in
delineating the nature and varieties of human knowledge than in being able
to explain and predict the changes taking place in the character of
economically significant knowledge activities.
Another way of highlighting this issue is to return briefly to the previous
discussion of the critique of the implicit assumptions of new growth theory
regarding the composition of the knowledge stock. Both camps in this
incipient debate implicitly have been regarding the “ composition of
knowledge by type,”  i.e. the codified-tacit mix, as exogenous— a matter
for epistemologists, cognitive scientists and students of human
psychologists. In other words, it seems to be something that is essentially
pre-determined by non-economic conditions affecting the supply of
knowledge. But, this approach mistakenly ignores the influence of the range
of considerations impinging upon the demand for codified vs. uncodified
knowledge. Some of these factors involve institutional arrangements
affecting the structure of relative rewards for codification activities,
whereas others have to do with the state of available technologies
affecting the costs of rendering knowledge in codified form, and the
storage, retrieval and transmission of information.
7.1 The endogeneity of the tacit/codification boundary
Any agent makes a decision about what kind of knowledge activity to pursue.
Should the output be codified or uncodified? Are the inputs manifest or
latent? For an economist, there is a simple one-line answer: It depends on
the costs and benefits. This implies that where knowledge activities are
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located (the extent to which agents codify their knowledge for example),
will depend on economic considerations, and the boundaries may move in
response to changes that are external to the knowledge system per se. To
this we now turn.
The endogeneity of the tacit-codified boundary (or the Merton-Kuhn frontier
of figure 1a) refers to the fact that the agents pursuing a knowledge
activity have a choice regarding whether or not to codify the knowledge
they use and produce. In analyzing the economics of this choice, we need—
even more so than above— to consider only knowledge which is codifiable,
the issue being to analyze the rationale for codifying knowledge. Different
situations arise: knowledge can be in a state of true tacitness but
codifiable; the codebook can exist or not; it can be displaced or not. Each
situation will generate its own cost-benefit problems, which we address
through the concept of the knowledge environment.
In practice, the extent to which knowledge is codified is determined by
incentives: the costs and benefits of doing so. For example, many factors—
such as, to take the simplest argument, the high cost of codifying a
certain type of knowledge— can decrease the incentives to go further, by
lowering the private rate of return on codification. This low rate of
return can, in turn, induce the maintenance of a large community of people
possessing the tacit knowledge. In this case, there will be a labor market
that can be used to store and transfer the knowledge from firm to firm. Of
course, the presence of a thick labor market as a way of transferring
knowledge further reduces incentives to codify. (See the policy discussion
above.)
A self-reinforcing process of this kind can generate multiple equilibria.
If, for example, there are high returns to codification, more knowledge
will be codified. This will decrease the value of a thick labor market as a
means of maintaining and distributing (tacit) knowledge. As the labor
market shrinks, the relative value of codification increases further. Thus
there are two possible equilibria: one with significant resources devoted
to codification and a resulting high incentive to codify; and one with few
resources so devoted, a thick, active market for skilled labor as the
mechanism for storing and disseminating knowledge, and thus low incentives
to codify. This argument rests on there being substitutability in the
production process between the types of knowledge transferred by these two
mechanisms.
This focus on endogenous limitations indicates that costs and benefits and
the resulting incentive structures are pivotal in shaping the dynamics of
codification. Emphasizing the role of the incentive structures by no means
implies that the codification of new forms of knowledge is an instantaneous
process: moving the boundaries between codified and tacit parts of the
stock of knowledge is a matter of long-term technological and institutional
26
evolution; involving changes in incentive structures, and in costs and
benefits.
7.2 Costs, benefits and the knowledge environment
In order to understand the sources and magnitudes of costs and benefits, it
is necessary to put them in the context of the knowledge environment. A
first and straightforward point is that the incentives will depend to a
very great extent on the possibility of proceeding to codification on the
basis of pre-existing codebooks (languages, models and techniques,
according to the framework of Cowan and Foray (1997)).
When the language and the model already exist, the fixed costs, those born
to generate the now standard models and languages, have already been sunk
in situations of this sort: languages and models have been developed by
past work, and are known by codifiers and users. Such a situation describes
both cases in which codebooks are manifest and those in which codebooks are
displaced. The idea here is that some existing body of well-developed,
stable, codified knowledge, often one that is displaced, contains the
necessary concepts and relations with which to codify the knowledge in
question. The only cost then is the variable one. On the other hand, if
codebooks do not exist, or are incomplete or ambiguous, costs of
codification entail more than simply the variable costs. Further, before a
language has been standardized and is stable, linguistic ambiguity implies
that codes which appear to represent codified knowledge can change their
meanings as the language is developed and refined, and as vocabulary
expands and changes. It is, thus, useful to differentiate between contexts
of stability and contexts of change.
7.3 Costs and benefits in a stable context
In a stable context— when there is a community of agents who have made the
necessary initial investments to develop a language and to maintain
efficient procedures of language acquisition for new entrants— the transfer
of messages can be assimilated to transfer of knowledge, and storing
messages means recording knowledge.
On the benefit side, the efficiency of codification will be greater in very
large systems having specific requirements regarding co-ordination among
agents. We identify five classes of situations: (i) systems involving many
agents and many locations; (ii) systems strongly based on re-combination
and re-use and which take advantage of the cumulativeness of existing
knowledge (rather than on independent innovation); (iii) systems that
require recourse to detailed memory; (iv) systems which need particular
kinds of description of what (and how) the agents do; and lastly, (v)
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systems characterized by an intensive usage of information technologies. We
take these up ad seriatim.
First, codification will provide high benefits in stable systems
characterized by specific requirements of knowledge transfer and
communication. This kind of requirement can result from a tendency towards
de-localization and externalization or from the development of co-operative
research, entailing a spatial distribution with activity at many places.
This first effect can be appreciated without any ambiguity, for example in
science. It operates, however, within a given “ clique”  or network— that
is a community which shares common codes and the tacit knowledge to
interpret them.
Second, in (stable) systems of innovation where advances and novelties
mainly proceed from re-combination, re-use and cumulativeness, benefits of
codification are important. Gibbs (1994) claims that the very limited
progress in the productivity of software engineering is due to an excessive
dependence on craft-like skills (in contrast for example with chemical
engineering). The schema that Gibbs has in mind is that once an algorithm
is written as apiece of code, it can be used in many applications— at least
in principle. The practical difficulty in doing so arises in part because
of a lack of standardization both in the way code is written and the way
algorithms are employed. This lack of technological rationalization impedes
the full realization of the opportunities provided by there-use and re-
combination model.
Third, systems that require extensive memory and retrieval capacities (e.g.
firms with long development cycles, high rates of turn-over, some
particular demographic problems or institutions confronted by a big
technological bifurcation) will greatly benefit from codification. In those
systems, too little codification increases the risk of “ accidental
uninvention” . MacKenzie and Spinardi (1995) showed, for example, that
specific local and tacit knowledge was so important in the nuclear weapons
design process that there was always a risk of losing critical elements of
the knowledge base simply due to the turnover of scientists and engineers—
a risk of technological retrogression, or at best costly reconstruction of
previous tacit capabilities.
The same argument is readily extended to cover situations in which
knowledge has been thoroughly codified in the form of algorithms, or
operating instructions, but the text of the “ source code”  for these— or
an understanding of the language in which it was recorded— has ceased to be
readily decipherable, or has simply been misplaced, or destroyed. The
result is a paradoxical one: the technology in which the knowledge has been
embedded may continue to work, as is the case when the computer implements
the machine-language version of its instructions. But, as has been found to
be the case with some major pieces of “ legacy software” , the human agents
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who can no longer read or write the source code are unable to emend or
elaborate those machine-language encoded instructions, or repair defects in
the original source code that have become evident. It is possible that even
beyond the range of such algorithmic technologies, cultural inventions and
culturally transmitted skills important for activities upon which social
welfare depends— such as those involved in dispute resolution— may become
lost because “ the market”  for agents possessing tacit knowledge of that
kind is undermined by the competition of more fully codified (legal)
procedures.
Fourth, systems, which need accurate descriptions of what agents are doing
(either to meet quality standards constraints, or to patent innovations, or
to enter into contractual relations with a partner), will benefit greatly
from codification. Here we can also include systems confronted with
inefficient market transactions, where the traditional mechanisms of legal
warranty, insurance, reputation and test are not efficient means to
mitigate the effects of information asymmetry (Gunby, 1996). Recording
production practices, which is a form of codification based on recent
language innovation (in the form of creating standards for record keeping)
is aimed at reducing these asymmetries.
Fifth, and last but not least, a sort of cross-situation deals with the
lack of productivity gains from the use of ITs, due to incomplete
codification. Fully taking advantage of the potential productivity gains of
IT typically demands not only the adoption of the technology but also
organizational change (see Cowan, 1995.) But a firm undergoing
organizational change does not want to lose functionality in the process.
The firm must develop jointly the new technology and organizational
structures that will reproduce old functions and create new ones (see David
1991, 1994). It is obvious that if too much of the old functionality
resides in tacit knowledge, or depends heavily on it, this task will be
extremely difficult. When the presence of tacit knowledge operates as a
bottleneck, impeding the full realization of productivity potential, the
firm can expect great benefits from codification (Baumol et al., 1989).
This, indeed, may be the role of management consultants, referred to
earlier.
In all these cases, where important operations of transfer, re-combination,
description, memorization and adaptation of existing knowledge (to ITs) are
required, it would be very costly and inefficient to keep this knowledge
tacit. Thus, there can be under-investment in codification, co-existing
with “ excess of tacitness.”  Given the nature, degree and pace of recent
technical change, it is likely that the current equilibrium involves an
allocation of resources devoted to knowledge generation and transmission
under conditions of tacitness which is neither socially nor privately
efficient, because knowledge that should be made more widely available in
codified form remains uncodified, whereas a lot of resources are poured
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into the production of differentiated “ information”  that is
idiosyncratically coded in the hope of being able to capture private rents.
Now, the way through which companies or other entities can manage a process
of codification in a situation in which a large portion of the knowledge
base is tacit raises many issues. Thus occasionally (in times of stress)
the organization seeks the aid of some external management consultant to
identify what things it really “ knows how”  to do. A great deal of
management literature has by now been spun around that conceptualization,
so it may be found reassuring to notice an implication of our topographic
structure, namely, that collective procedural knowledge may be
unarticulated, but is perfectly (or at least workably) “ codifiable.”
A more interesting issue for the skeptical economist to ponder in that
connection is simply this: why is it that the organization— having somehow
acquired and successfully deployed its “ core capabilities”  without
needing to make them explicit—  now requires, or finds it profitable to
employ the costly services of outside management consultants to break the
spell of tacitness. In most of the specific cases discussed in management
literatures this question is not posed. But, there is a suggestion that the
organization has either forgotten what it once knew and acted upon
collectively, or that the situation in which it operates has been altered
without prompting a timely revision of the collective awareness of the mis-
match created between opportunities and capabilities to exploit them. The
presumption, therefore, is that it will take too long, or be too risky, to
go through a tacit, trial and error learning process. Bringing explicit
analysis to bear— and so codifying the organization’s understanding of
itself and its situation— will prove either more expedient or less costly,
or both, than continuing in tacit mode.12
7.4 Costs and benefits in the context of change
While many knowledge activities take place in a relatively stable context,
some particular domains or sectors are characterized by acknowledge
environment exhibiting ongoing rapid transformations.
Models and languages are fluid, and the community of agents conversant with
the models and languages is itself changing. The fluidity of the language
implies that there exists a certain amount of uncertainty about what the
messages actually mean because there is uncertainty, and perhaps change,
with regard to the vocabulary in which they are written. Even when
scientific papers express new discoveries, or re-examine old results in
some “ natural”  language, much jargon specific to the subject matter
                    
12Reference may be made here to the work of Cobbenhagen (1999).
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remains; ‘terms of art’ are employed whose meanings are lost on outsiders;
and, in formal modeling, definitions of variables specific to the model may
remain in flux as the model itself is modified and reconciled with
observational data. In an important sense, the progress of research
involves— and requires— the stabilization of meanings, which is part of the
social process through which the stabilization of beliefs about the
reliability of knowledge comes about.
To the extent that codification is taking place under those conditions, the
benefits from it have substantial “ spillover”  elements, as they
contribute largely to the modeling and language development parts of the
exercise. There may be competition among different basic models, and so
among the basic tenets and vocabulary of the language. Until this
competition is resolved the community of potential knowledge generators and
users will have difficulty communicating, and the value of knowledge
codification that arises from dissemination will be reduced. Thus the
codification process in this environment generates some immediate value
(which derives both from worth of the content of the messages that agents
can transmit and interpret with less effort and expense, and from the value
to the agent of storage and retrieval of his own knowledge), but it has
greater value as an investment good— a contribution to the resolution of
the competition among variant languages and models.
It is in the context of change that we expect to find situations of
“ excess codification.”  That is to say, the accumulation of successive
generation of codes can prevent the development of radically new knowledge,
simply because explicating and understanding it would require entirely new
codes. As argued by Arrow (1974, p.56) codification entails organizational
rigidity and uniformity while increasing communication and transaction
efficiency: “ the need for codes mutually understandable within an
organization imposes a uniformity requirement on the behavior of
participants. They are specialized in the information capable of being
transmitted by the codes, so that they learn more in the direction of their
activity and become less efficient in acquiring and transmitting
information not easily fitted into the code.”
It is clear, therefore, that codification can have unfortunate consequences
for creativity and radical changes. Like a larger category of co-ordination
mechanisms, codified knowledge can be a potent “ carrier of history” —
encapsulating influences of essentially transient and possibly extraneous
natures that were present in the circumstances prevailing when particular
codes took shape; and, having that power, it can become a source of “ lock
in”  to obsolete conceptual schemes, and to technological and
organizational systems that are built around those.
The second problem we have thus identified deals with “ excess inertia” .
There are high fixed costs to be borne in the process of codification,
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especially when the cognitive environment is changing. Roughly put, costs
of learning and developing languages in which new codes are being written
will be incurred during the period when the knowledge environment is in
flux, whereas benefits will accrue (from some of those investment) during a
subsequent period of stabilization and widespread dissemination of the
information. During a period of change, infrastructure is developed,
languages and models are built, learned and standardized, and a community
of agents with shared tacit knowledge grows. All of these investments
contribute to a reduction in the fluidity of the knowledge environment, and
conduce to hastening the enjoyment of the increasing returns from more
widespread application that are permitted by the stabilization of
organizational and technological knowledge. As a network of users of the
knowledge expands, learning costs continue to decline and co-ordination
externalities are likely to grow more significant as a source of social
benefits.
But if developing new languages and models allocates the fixed cost to one
generation while many future generations benefit from the new
infrastructure to codify knowledge, there is an inter-generational
externality problem which can result in a lack of adequate private (or
social) incentives for allocating resources to the development of more
powerful codes, and systematizing those that already exist. Solutions that
would help mitigate this kind of time inconsistency problem entail the
development of relevant markets (which may significantly increase the
benefits even for the first generation of developers), or the creation of
infinitely-lived institutions that do not discount the future so strongly,
or with the cultivation of altruistic preferences for the welfare of coming
generations to which a greater stock of useable knowledge can be bequeathed
(see Konrad and Thum, 1993).
8. Conclusions and the direction of further work
This paper has looked intensively and critically at one of the several
dimensions David and Foray (1996) identified that in their schematic
description of the space in which “ knowledge-products”  were distributed.
Our focus has been maintained on the most problematic and, for many
economists, the most esoteric of the three axes defining that space: the
dimension along which codification appeared at one extremum and tacitness
occupied the other. This has permitted some further unpacking of the
economic determinants of codification decisions, and the resources
committed thereto, and it has revealed that the term tacit is being used so
loosely in the current economics of science and technology literature that
important distinctions, such as the one separating that which is uncodified
in a particular context and that which will not (likely) be codified at
all, are blurred, or entirely lost. Also lost from view in many modern
discussions of codification is the important difference between
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codification of procedural knowledge, as distinct from factual
propositions. By bringing these into greater prominence, a number of
puzzles and inconsistencies which detract from the logic of the analysis of
the social return to investment in codification can be resolved.
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